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THE VALUE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY
FISH CONSUMPTION ADVISORIES
Paul M. Jakus and Christopher G. Leggett

ABSTRACT

THE VALUE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY
FISH CONSUMPTION ADVISORIES

Introduction

Accurate information about products and their attributes allows consumers to make
optimal consumption decisions. For many products, this information can be obtained through
direct observation, advertising, or discussions with others. However, for products that have the
potential to affect consumer health, such as food or drugs, direct observation provides little
useful information, and advertising can be misleading. As a result, public agencies have
intervened in a variety of markets to attempt to provide consistent and understandable
information to consumers. Examples include nutrition labeling, organic certification, and
cigarette warnings.
Efforts to measure the benefits of this information have been somewhat limited, partly
because traditional welfare analysis centers around Hicksian demand curves as representations of
consumers' marginal willingness to pay for a product. When consumers choose quantities of a
good under imperfect information, the link between demand curves and consumer welfare is
often severed. In the case of goods that affect human health, consumers' decisions will be based
on perceptions of attributes, but utility will be determined by the actual attributes. For example,
the area under the Hicksian demand for contaminated beef does not represent consumer benefits
from consumption if consumers continue to purchase the product only because they are
completely unaware of the contamination. In an application to milk contamination, Foster and
Just (1989) introduce a framework for conducting welfare analysis in situations where consumers
have imperfect information about product quality. They use a restricted expenditure function to
model a situation where the quantity purchased is determined by the consumer's perception of
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quality, but utility is determined by the actual quality of the good. By observing consumer
demand for milk after information about contamination became publicly available, Foster and
Just are able to calculate the losses incurred during the period when the public unwittingly
consumed contaminated milk.
This paper extends the Foster and Just (1989) work by demonstrating an approach to
estimating the value of information about a good in a discrete choice setting. Following the
Foster and Just framework, Leggett (2002) recently developed a welfare measure for the random
utility model (RUM) under imperfect information that is a generalization of the perfectinformation welfare measure developed by Hanemann (1982) and Small and Rosen (1981). Here,
we demonstrate the application of this welfare measure in an investigation of the value to
recreational anglers of information about the risks associated with consuming contaminated fish.
These risks are typically communicated to anglers through fish consumption advisories (FCAs),
which are issued by states to inform anglers of potential health hazards associated with fish
consumption. We have survey data that indicates which Tennessee anglers are aware ofFCAs
and which are not, and we use information from the behavior of the aware anglers to estimate the
potential gains from providing information about FCAs to the unaware anglers.
We need to look at Teisl et al. (2001) and Piggott and Marsh (2004) and paper Shaw
recommended.

Welfare Analysis when Information is Imperfect

The key insight underlying the Foster and Just (1989) approach to welfare analysis under
imperfect information is that from the researcher's perspective, there are two relevant utility
functions. The first is the utility function that the consumer maximizes in choosing what to
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purchase. The quantities and perceived qualities of the various available goods are arguments in
this first utility function. However, because the consumer's perceptions of quality may be
incorrect, he may not achieve the level of utility that he expects. Thus, the second utility function
describes the consumer's actual utility from consumption. The quantities and actual qualities of
the available goods are arguments of this second utility function. In order to conduct welfare
analysis, both utility functions are needed: the first utility function describes consumer choice,
while the second utility function describes utility realized from consumption.
For example, in the Foster and Just (1989) application, consumers maximized utility by
choosing quantities of milk to purchase assuming that the milk was healthy and safe. However,
the utility from milk consumption is ultimately determined by the actual level of contamination
in the milk consumed. Similarly, anglers make decisions about which fishing sites to visit having
in mind one set of product attributes, when these assumptions may be in error or based upon
incorrect information. Anglers' choices based upon the assumption of uncontaminated fish at a
site will not yield the level of utility expected if the fish are actually contaminated.

The Continuous Demand Model
This section describes and clarifies the Foster and Just approach to welfare analysis under
imperfect information, presenting imperfect information welfare measures for a variety of choice
situations, assuming demand for a consumer good is continuous.
Assume that the consumer maximizes utility by choosing quantities of a numeraire good
(z) and a good (x) that can be characterized by its quality (b). One might think ofx as the
quantity of fish and b as the level of mercury in the fish. The quality of the good is assumed to
affect the consumer's health in a stochastic manner. Let

1C = 1C(X, b)

represent the probability that

the consumer will later become sick due to his consumption of the good, and assume that n(.) is
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increasing in both of its arguments. Let u(z,x,l) represent the consumer's utility in the sick state,
and let u(z,x,O)represent the consumer's utility in the healthy state, so that expected utility can
be written as Eu(z,x,b) = Jr(b, x)u(z, x,l) + (l-Jr(b,x))u(z,x,O). Assuming complete information
and expected utility maximization, the consumer's problem is
max{Eu(z,x,b) : y
z ,x

= z + px},

where y represents income and p represents the price of the good. The consumer's expenditure
function can then be defined as
e(p,Eu,b)

= min{z + px: Eu(z,x,b) ~ Eu},
z,x

implying a Hicksian demand for environmental quality, x = x(p,Eu,b).
In order to explore welfare measurement under imperfect information, let b * represent the

consumer's perception of the quality of the good. The individual's consumption decisions are
I

based on b *, but health outcomes are determined solely by b. (Thus, we assume that perceptions
of quality do not affect utility after the consumption decision has been made.) The consumer
selects x and z to maximize Eu(z,x,b*), but his true expected utility is given by Eu(z,x,b). This
situation can be modeled with a restricted expenditure function (Foster and Just, 1989),
e(p,Eu,b,x(p,Eu,b *))= min{z + px: x
z,x

= x(p,Eu,b *),Eu(z,x,b) ~ EU}

= min{z + px(p,Eu,b*): Eu(z,x,b)
z

~ EU}.

(1)

Here, the quantity of x chosen by the consumer is restricted to equal the quantity that would be
chosen under the consumer's perception of quality, but expected utility is ultimately a function
of true quality.

1 In the interest of simplicity, we assume that although the consumer has imperfect information about quality, he has
complete information about the effect of quality (and quantity) on health, Jr(b, x).
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This restricted expenditure function allows us to define welfare measures for situations
where both information and quality might change. Assume that there is a change in quality,
information about quality, or both. Quality levels and perceptions prior to the change are denoted
with a superscript 0 (bo and bO*, respectively), while quality levels and perceptions after the
change are denoted with a superscript 1 (b I and b I *, respectively). For the purposes of this
discussion, we assume that b I > bOo When bO = bO*, the consumer has complete information
about quality prior to the change, and when b I

=

1

b *, the consumer has complete information

about quality after the change. The matrix in Fig. 1 depicts the four potential combinations of
information and quality within this framework. The arrows labeled 1 to 6 represent information
andlor quality changes, and the corresponding welfare measures are defined as follows:
cv l = e(p,Eu,b o ) -e(p,Eu,b l )
cv 2 = e(p,Eu,b 0 ) - ~(
e p,Eu,b I ,x(p,Eu, b1* ) )

= e(p,Eu,b o ,x(p,Eu,b o*))- e(p,Eu,b 1 ,x(p,Eu,b 1*))
cv 4 = ~(
e p,Eu,b I ,x(p,Eu, b1* ) ) - e(p,Eu,b I )
cv 5 = ~(
e p,Eu,b 0 ,x(p,Eu,b 0* ) ) -e(p,Eu,b 0 )
cv 6 = ~(
e p,Eu,b 0 ,x(p,Eu, b O* ) ) - e(p,Eu, bl)
cv

3

The first welfare measure, cv 1, is the traditional measure of compensating variation for a
change in quality under complete information. The second measure, cv2, is the compensating
variation for a change in quality when consumers have incomplete information about quality
after the change. Suppose, for example, that quality has been constant for a long period of time,
so that consumers have had time to learn about the true level of quality. If quality suddenly
improves, consumers' perceptions might lag behind the change. Alternatively, consumers might
have a sensationalist response to news about a small change in quality. In both cases, consumers
would purchase a quantity of the good according to their perception of quality after the change,
but the new level of quality will affect their health. The third measure, cv3 , is applicable in
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situations where consumers have incomplete information about true quality levels both before
and after a change occurs.
Without restricting perceptions of quality before and after the change, it is possible for
both cv2 and cv3 to be negative, even

if true quality improves. Consider the following scenario. A

consumer purchases 50 fish per year when mercury levels in the fish are measured at 10 parts per
billion (Ppb), and she knows that mercury levels are at 10 ppb. A government program leads to a
reduction in mercury, so that levels in fish are now at 8 ppb. The consumer sees general news
stories about the improvement, she believes that mercury levels have dropped to 0 ppb, and she
chooses to purchase 500 fish per year. In this case, the true quality level has improved, but the
consumer could potentially be worse off after the improvement as a result of incomplete
information.
Welfare measures cv4 and cv5 capture the value of information about quality, holding true
quality constant. With cv4 , true quality is held constant at b I , and the consumer's perception of
quality changes from b 1*~ b 1 to b 1*= b 1. The expenditure function after the change is
unrestricted, because it represents a consumption decision made under complete information,
while the expenditure function before the change is restricted, because the consumer has
incomplete information. Similarly, cv5 measures the value of information about quality when true
quality is held constant at bOo These measures might be applicable if, for example, a government
agency informed consumers about mercury levels in fish rather than actually changing those
levels. The new information would allow the consumer to make more informed decisions.
Finally, cv6 measures the value of a change in both quality and information.
It is informative to compare the traditional welfare measure for a change in

environmental quality, cv 1, with several of the other welfare measures presented above. Note, for
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example, that cv 1 > cv2 and cv 1 < cv6 . The fact that cv 1 > cv2 implies that when information is
incomplete after an improvement in quality (but complete before the improvement in quality),
the traditional welfare measure will be biased upwards. The fact that cv 1 < cv6 implies that when
information is incomplete before an improvement in quality (but complete after the improvement
in quality), the traditional welfare measure will be biased downwards. The relationship between
cv 1 and cv3 is ambiguous, implying that the direction of bias is unknown for situations where
information is imperfect both before and after an improvement in objective quality. With cv4 and
cv5, quality is held constant, so a comparison with cv 1 would not be informative.

These welfare measures may be useful in evaluating alternative policy responses to
persistent chemical contamination when consumer information may be incomplete. In the case of
chemical contamination of game fish, for example, regulators may choose to address the source
of the contamination directly and thereby reduce contaminant levels in fish, or they may simply
choose to issue fish consumption advisories so that anglers are more informed and can avoid the
health effects of the contaminants through changes in behavior. Welfare measures cv3 and cv5
would be useful in comparing the net benefits of these two policy responses. cv3 could be used to
measure the benefits associated with reduced contaminant levels, assuming that anglers'
information about contamination remains incomplete, while cv5 could be used to measure the
benefit of providing anglers with improved information about contamination through fish
consumption advisories. Alternatively, when an actual clean-up is mandated by law, cv4 provides
an estimate of the additional benefit from an information campaign designed to inform anglers
about the improvement in quality resulting from the clean-up.
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The Discrete Choice Random Utility Model
Leggett (2002) extends the Foster and Just (1989) approach to welfare analysis to a
discrete choice setting, developing welfare measures for the RUM that are analogous to the
welfare measures presented above. The standard RUM, grounded in certainty and perfect
knowledge of attribute levels, is based on the notion that a person will select alternative} from
among a set of S discrete options by comparing the utility associated with alternative} with the
utility associated with all other alternatives. The indirect utility associated with choice} is
assumed to be given by
V(p},M,b}) + c}

where Pj is the price associated with alternative}, M is income, bj is a vector of quality attributes
associated with alternative}, and

c}

represents the effect of characteristics of alternative} that

are observable to the individual but unobservable from the researcher's perspective. Assuming
an extreme value distribution for these errors gives rise to the conditionallogit model, allowing
one to estimate the parameters of the indirect utility function.
Hanemann (1982) and Small and Rosen (1981) derived the following welfare measure for
the conditionallogit model:
(2)

where y is the marginal utility of income. The quality variable, b, is superscripted, indicating that
a change in quality attributes is being valued. A superscript of zero indicates quality attributes
under initial conditions, while a superscript of one indicates quality attributes under the new
conditions. The welfare measure is denoted CV P to indicate that it is derived under the
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assumption that the consumer has perfect information about the attributes of all of the
alternatives.
Now assume that the consumer does not have perfect information about the attributes of

r

the alternatives. Let b
conditions, and let

represent the vector of perceived attributes of alternative} under initial

br represent the vector of perceived attributes of alternative} under the new

conditions. Leggett (2002 ) shows that if consumer choices are determined by perceptions of
attributes and utility is determined by actual attributes, the appropriate welfare measure is given
by

where Jr~* is the probability of choosing alternative} under the new conditions, or

exp(V(pj ,M,b~* )

1*

Jr

-=-----j

and

Jr5*

-

~

~kES

V(P M b 1*) ,
k'

'k

is the probability of choosing alternative} under the initial conditions. The welfare

measure is denoted CV I to indicate that it allows the consumer to have imperfect information
about the attributes of the alternatives.
Conceptually,

CV can be thought of as having two components.

The first two log-sums

are similar to the perfect-information welfare measure and can be thought of as the "anticipated"
benefits of the change, or the benefits that would be realized if the actual attributes of the
alternatives (before and after the change) were identical to the consumer's perceptions. The final
summation can be viewed as an adjustment for imperfect information. The adjustment is a
function of the difference, for each alternative, between the perceived utility and the actual
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utility, weighted by the probability of selecting that alternative.

CV is a generalization of cV: if

br = b~ and br = b~ for all} (i.e. , perceptions are correct), the two expressions are identical.
Finally, we note that

CV is the discrete choice analog to cv3, while cV is the discrete choice

analog to cv 1. Discrete choice welfare measures analogous to cv2, cv4, cv5, and cv6 can also be
easily derived from

CV.

Data
Angler data were collected as part of a long-term project sponsored by the Tennessee
Wildlife Resources Agency, with random-digit dial telephone surveys of Tennessee residents
conducted every six months. All respondents were asked about their fishing-related activities
during the previous six months, and the data used in this analysis concern all reservoir anglers
interviewed during four successive random digit dial surveys. The data cover reservoir fishing
activities during one of four six-month periods stretching from March 1997 through February
1999. 2 The data do not represent a true panel data set in that each angler appears only once in the
data. Responses cover only one of the four six-month periods, and the dataset is restricted to 457
reservoir anglers from a 34-county region of east Tennessee. Survey questions asked anglers
about all trips to all Tennessee lakes and reservoirs during the specified six-month period. For
each reservoir, anglers were asked how many fish were caught and how many fish were released
on a typical trip to that reservoir. Anglers were also asked if they were aware of fish

2 The six-month periods were March through August 1997, September 1997 through February 1998, March 1998
through August 1998, and September 1998 through February 1999.
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consumption advisories on Tennessee reservoirs and if they typically used a boat on their fishing
trips.

Fish Consumption Advisories

Consumption of contaminated fish represents a latent risk to humans. That is, the health
effects of contamination are not immediately apparent but are revealed only after prolonged
exposure to the contaminant. For latent risks, the Environmental Protection Agency provides an
estimate of the reference dose of a contaminant, or RID, above which chronic exposure to the
contaminant increases the risk of developing the adverse health effect (EPA, 2000). The RID is
used in conjunction with data on contaminant concentrations in fish, assumptions regarding
human body weight, and assumptions regarding meal sizes to derive an estimate of the maximum
number of fish meals that should be consumed during any time period. In general, a fish
consumption advisory consists of two parts: the recommended number of meals and the target
population for the meal recommendation. Due to differences in body weights, the number of
meals may differ between the general population of adults as one target group, and pregnant
women, nursing mothers, and children as a second target group, with recommended consumption
levels generally lower for the second group than the first.
There are 12 major reservoirs in East Tennessee, all of which are operated by the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Six of the 12 reservoirs have fish consumption advisories
for one or more species of fish due to contamination from polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).
PCBs are considered probable human carcinogens, and fetal exposure is " ... correlated with
lower birth weights, smaller head circumference, and short gestational age" (EPA, 2000, p. 5-
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97.) Fish consumption advisories are listed in the Tennessee Fishing Regulations booklet, and
they are posted at all boat launches and major bank fishing sites.
Many studies have shown that despite attempts by public agencies to provide information
about fish consumption advisories to anglers, a significant proportion of anglers often remain
unaware of the advisories (see Allen et aI., 1996; May and Burger, 1996; and Burger, 1998). Of
the 457 anglers in our dataset, X percent claimed to be unaware of the fish consumption
advisories. [Paul: is there anything else we can say about these "unaware" folks? Do we

want to compare their characteristics to the "aware" folks (age, income, education, years of
fishing, number of trips taken, etc.) either through a summary table or through a simple
logit analysis that explains awareness as a function of a bunch of angler characteristics?]

Econometric Model
Several simplifying assumptions are required in order make this problem empirically
tractable. First, we assume that with the exception of fish consumption advisories, anglers have
perfect information about site attributes. Second, we assume that a trip to any reservoir with a
fish consumption advisory increases the angler's lifetime cancer risk by a specific amount, c5 ,
that is constant across all reservoirs with advisories. Third, we assume that anglers who state that
they are aware of the advisories are aware of this increase in cancer risk, while anglers unaware
of the advisories are not. We believe that the assumption of a fixed increase in cancer risk is not
unreasonable, given the significant scientific uncertainty regarding the precise risk associated
with the consumption of PCB-contaminated fish. Furthermore, it may be consistent with the way
anglers view sites with advisories; they may pay little attention to the wording of the advisory
and simply view all sites with advisories as identically "tainted." The assumption of a cancer risk
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that is constant across sites allows us to represent cancer risk with a dummy variable equal to one
for all sites with advisories and zero for all sites without advisories. However, it is important to
recognize that in reality, 8 will be a function of PCB concentrations; the number, type, and size
of fish that the angler eats from the site; the techniques that the angler uses to prepare and cook
the fish (e.g., trimming fat); and other angler-specific characteristics.
Our goal is to estimate the value of providing information about advisories to anglers
who are currently unaware of the advisories. That is, what is the value of informing unaware
anglers about the advisories so that perceived risk is updated from zero to 8? Note that although
unaware anglers may perceive zero risks, their utility is still determined by the true risk level at
each contaminated site: consuming fish caught at the site will increase their lifetime cancer risk,
whether or not they are aware of it. Thus, our approach involves using information on site
choice behavior for anglers aware of the advisories to make inferences about health-related
losses suffered by anglers unaware of the advisories.
We estimate a simple site-choice random utility model for reservoir fishing in East
Tennessee (Tab Ie 1). All parameters are statistically significant and 0 f the expected sign. Travel
Cost is negative, such that more distant sites with higher costs are less likely to be visited than

closer sites. Catch Rate is positive; a higher catch rate makes a site more likely to be visited than
a site with a lower catch rate, all else equal. The Reservoir Health Index is a metric used by
TVA to evaluate the aquatic and biological status of each reservoir. Higher values indicate better
health of the reservoir. The sign of this variable is positive, indicating that, all else equal,
reservoirs with better health are more likely to be visited than reservoirs with poorer health.
Those who fish primarily from a boat are more likely to choose sites with more boat ramps than
those sites with fewer ramps (Ramps*Boater). The site-specific constant for Watts Bar
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Reservoir is included to account for the unique aspects of the site (it is heavily commercialized
relative to most of the other sites). As expected, the sign is positive.
The key variable for this analysis is the interaction between the presence of a fish
consumption advisory on a reservoir and an angler's awareness of advisories (FCA *Aware of

FCA). The interaction term is composed of FCA, which takes the value of one if fish
consumption advisories are present and zero otherwise, and Aware ofFCA, which takes the value
of one if the angler was aware of advisories and zero otherwise. If the angler is not aware of
advisories (Aware of FCA=O) and an FCA is present (FCA=l), the angler has misjudged quality,
the interaction term takes the value of zero, and the presence of an FCA does not impact site
choice. FCAs will affect site choice only if an advisory is present (FCA=l) and an angler is
aware of the advisories (Aware of FCA=l) such that the interaction term takes the value of one.
The expected sign of this variable is negative, and the econometric model indeed returns a
statistically significant, negative coefficient.

Calculating the Value ofInformation about FCAs
Consider first a policy scenario in which a state or federal agency aggressively pursues a
policy of improved information about fish consumption advisories, so that all anglers initially
unaware of the advisories are made aware of them. For those already aware of advisories, the
welfare measure will be zero because the difference of the first two terms in equation (3) will be
zero (no change in perceived quality) and there will be no misinformation adjustment. For those
who were initially unaware of advisories, the value of this new information is given by

(4)
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The sum of the first two tenns in (4), the "anticipated benefits," are negative in this case, as
anglers learn that reservoir fishing is not as safe as originally thought. These anticipated benefits
are adjusted upwards by the final summation, which accounts for the fact that before the
infonnation update, anglers were choosing fishing sites under mistaken assumptions about health
effects.
The estimated values for infonnation about fish consumption advisories are reported in
Table 2. The mechanics of the calculation are such that the value to those with perfect
infonnation is zero; for those with imperfect infonnation, the value of improved infonnation is
estimated at $0.025 per trip. At the mean number of trips by the sample of "unaware" anglers
(11.57 trips per six month period), this works out to $0.29 per six-month period for the six
contaminated sites, or about $0.05 per site. [Paul: I would prefer to drop this comparison to
the Michigan work. The context is so different, that this type of comparison isn't very
reassuring] This value compares favorably with the work of Kreiger and Hoehn (1998, 1999).
U sing a stated preference approach (as opposed to the revealed preference model used in this
paper), Kreiger and Hoehn estimate an annual value for providing infonnation for an additional
fishing site in Michigan at $0.046 per site. Given the few number of sites in Tennessee relative
to the 5800 publicly accessible sites in Michigan, one would expect the value of site-level
infonnation about contaminated fish to Tennessee anglers to be greater than for Michigan
anglers. Indeed, this appears to be the case.

Valuing a Change in Quality without Improving Information

The model reported in Table 1 can also be used to estimate the value of a quality change
in the absence of an improvement in infonnation. Many studies have estimated the value of a
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quality change for the removal of contaminated fish under the assumption of perfect information
(e.g., Parsons and Hauber 1998; Chen and Coslett 1998; Jakus et al. 1997; Montgomery and
Needelman 1997) or, when not assuming perfect information, doing so without an adjustment for
misinformation (e.g., J akus et al. 1998). The appropriate measure of the benefit of a quality
improvement under perfect information is given by (2), while the appropriate measure of the
benefit of a quality improvement under imperfect information is given by (3). The estimated
benefit associated with site cleanups that allow fish consumption advisories to be removed from
East Tennessee reservoirs [Paul: are all advisories removed, just one advisory, several

advisories?] are presented in Table 2 for both aware and unaware anglers. The benefits are
lower for anglers unaware of the advisories ($0.763 per trip) relative to those with perfect
information ($0.996). [do these results allow us to say something about the bias when

researchers estimate benefits assuming perfect information?] Perhaps the best context for
these estimates is the 1998 Jakus et al. study. This paper estimated a version of the standard sitechoice RUM model but augmented it with endogenously estimated catch rates for East
Tennessee reservoirs. Using a similar (but not identical) site choice specification to that used
here, Jakus et al. report the value of a quality change to anglers who were aware of advisories at
$1.49 per trip, a value that is within the 95% confidence interval reported in Table 2. 3 What
these authors did not do was report a value for anglers who were not aware of advisories; indeed
these authors assumed that the only value of advisories would be manifested from a rise in catch
rates as those aware of advisories engaged in catch-and-release. The misinformation adjusted
welfare measure shows that even unaware anglers benefit from the cleanup, but at a "reduced"
level.

3 Value chosen from the Jakus et al. specification (2). That this value is similar to that estimated in this study is not
surprising in that roughly half the data used in this study was also used by Jakus et al. in their 1998 paper.
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Conclusions
This study has demonstrated how welfare analysis can be conducted within a discrete
choice framework. We use data from a survey of Tennessee anglers to estimate the value of
improved information about fish consumption advisories as well as the value of quality
improvements when information remains imperfect. Given the rather strong assumptions
required to develop this estimate, the estimate should be viewed as illustrative. However,
improved estimates could be developed with survey data that provides improved information
about perceptions of the attributes of the available alternatives. These improved estimates could
be used in a cost-benefit analysis of a public information campaign about FeAs.
In addition, we demonstrate how the benefits of an actual quality change should be

calculated when information is imperfect.
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Table 1: Site Selection Model
Coefficient

Std.
Err.

Travel Cost

-0.046

0.001

Catch Rate

0.382

0.021

Reservoir Health
Index

0.032

0.002

0.022

0.001

Watts Bar Constant

0.404

0.067

FCA *Aware of FCA

-0.088

0.043

Variable

# Ramps

* Boater

All variables significant at u=O.Ol

Table 2: Value of Changes in Information and Quality
Not Aware of Advisories
(n=136)
Improve Infonnation with
$0.025
Quality Constant
($0.000 - $0.068)a
Improve Quality with
Infonnation Constant

$0.763
($0.036 - $1.484)

Aware of Advisories
(n=321)
$0.00
($0.000 - $0.000)
$0.996
($0.047 - $l.918)

aNumbers in parentheses represent 95% confidence interval as estimated by Krinsky-Robb
bootstrap (Krinsky and Robb 1986).
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Fig. 1: Potential Changes in Information and Environmental Quality

Low Quality

Incomplete
Information
(bs*~ bS,s =
0,1)

High Quality

3

(bo,bo*)

5

(b I ,bI *)

4

Complete
Information
(h s*= hS• 51 = 0.1)

Note: Within each cell, the variables in parentheses represent the objective quality level and the
perceived quality level, respectively. The arrows represent potential changes in information
and/or quality and are labeled 1 to 6 for easy reference to corresponding welfare measures in the
text.

